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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
JAMES ERROL CAMPBELL, 
Defendant / Appellant. 
Case No: 20100840-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court should have granted Campbell's request to instruct 
the jury on possession of drug paraphernalia as a lesser-included to possession of a 
controlled substance. "Whether a jury instruction on a lesser included offense is 
appropriate presents a question of law." State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, | 10, 152 P.3d 315 
{citing State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992)). "'[Whenever a defendant 
requests a jury instruction on a lesser included offense,' specific legal standards must be 
followed and 'the trial court has no discretion in the matter.'" State v. Payne, 964 P.2d 
327, 332 (Utah App. 1998) {citing State v. Simpson, 904 P.2d 709, 711 (Utah App. 
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1995)). "When considering whether a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense 
jury instruction, we 'view the evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the defense.'" Spillers, 2007 UT 13, if 10 {citing State v. Crick, 
675 P.2d 527, 539 (Utah 1983)). "In addition, when the defense requests a jury 
instruction on a lesser included offense, the requirements for inclusion of the instruction 
'should be liberally construed.'" Spillers, ^ 10 {citing State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424 
(Utah 1986)). This issue was preserved by motion at trial and the trial court placed the 
rejected instruction into the record "that the issue [would] be preserved..." R. 202: 128-
31. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in full in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
James Campbell appeals from the judgment, sentence and order of commitment of 
the Honorable Samuel McVey, Fourth District Court, after he was convicted by a jury of 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
On December 15, 2009 James Campbell was charged by information with 
possession of a controlled substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). R. 1. At the preliminary hearing on March 8, 2010 the 
State amended the charge to a third degree felony. R. 29, 200: 3. At the close of the 
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hearing, Judge Samuel McVey found probable cause and bound the charge over for trial. 
R. 200: 17. 
On June 23, 2010 Campbell filed a demand that he be allowed to confront and 
examine any of the State's foundation and chain of custody witnesses regarding any 
scientific reports that the State intended to introduce into evidence at trial. R. 34. 
On July 9, 2010 Campbell filed a motion to suppress statements that had 
been obtained from him in violation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. R. 101-96. The State responded arguing that although 
Campbell was in custody when he made the statements the questions asked did not 
constitute interrogation for Fifth Amendment purposes. R. 112-09. On July 15, 2010 a 
suppression hearing was heard by Judge McVey. R. 201. On July 16, 2010 Campbell 
submitted an addendum to his suppression motion. R. 155-50. On that same day, Judge 
McVey issued a written order denying Campbell's motion to suppress concluding that 
statements made in response to the police asking whether Campbell had "any sharp 
objects on his person" were "non-investigatory... prompted by a concern for officer 
safety." R. 148-46. 
On July 15, 2010 Campbell filed a motion in limine to exclude "any and all 
evidence and testimony related to field tests performed by officers on the suspected 
controlled substance in this case, and any and all testimony as to the results obtained from 
those field tests." R. 107-104. At trial the State did not offer any evidence related to the 
field test. R. 202:91-92. 
At trial defense counsel offered a proposed jury instruction for a lesser included 
3 
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offense of possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 161, 202: 127-31. The trial court denied 
the request for the lesser included instruction finding that although there was evidence of 
drug paraphernalia and the "prosecution could have certainly added an offense... 
pertaining to the [items of paraphernalia]", "the Court cannot conclude that the ~ that 
possession of heroin would have a lesser included offense of possession of heroin residue 
because it's still heroin... It's not paraphernalia. So it's not really a lesser included 
offense." R. 202: 130-31. 
On July 20, 2010 a jury trial was held with Judge McVey presiding. R. 192-91, 
202. After deliberating for two hours, the jury found Campbell guilty of possession of a 
controlled substance. R. 188,202: 161. 
On August 30, 2010 Campbell was sentenced to 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison. 
R. 194,203:5. 
On September 9, 2010 Campbell filed a notice of appeal in Fourth District Court. 
R. 196. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
July 20, 2019 Jury Trial 
A. Testimony of Officer Timothy Laursen 
Provo City police officer Timothy Laursen testified that on December 10, 2009 he 
and other officers were trying to locate Nancy Peterson, who had several outstanding 
arrest warrants. R. 202: 86. On that day, they received information that Peterson was 
with James Campbell at a residence on Cherokee Lane in Provo. R. 202: 86-87. 
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Laursen and Officer Hubbard arrived at the residence at approximately 10:30 a.m. 
R. 202: 87. The door of the residence was opened for another individual who had 
arrived at the house just prior. Id. The officers were greeted by Ms. Disbrow, who 
resides there. R. 202: 87-88. They asked if Peterson and Campbell were at the house. R. 
202: 88. Disbrow answered affirmatively and allowed them into the residence. R. 202: 
88. 
As Laursen and Hubbard walked up the stairs, Laursen observed both Peterson 
and Campbell. R. 202: 88. Peterson attempted to conceal herself by diving onto the 
floor. Id. Laursen drew his taser and ordered Campbell onto the ground as well. Id. 
Laursen then handcuffed Peterson and Hubbard did the same to Campbell. R. 202: 88-
89. 
Hubbard searched Campbell and gave Laursen a white contact lens case that had 
been removed from Campbell. R. 202: 89. Laursen opened the case lids outside the 
residence and found a brown cotton ball inside one of the case's compartments. R. 202: 
90. 
Laursen testified that based upon his experience, he believed that the brown 
substance on the cotton ball was heroin. R. 202: 92. He testified further that cotton 
is/can be used as a filter when heroin is taken into the body intravenously. R. 202: 93. 
Laursen placed both the case and the cotton ball in baggies and booked them as evidence. 
R. 202: 93. The cotton was subsequently sent to the crime lab for testing. Id. Campbell 
was arrested and taken to jail. R. 202: 96. Campbell was not tested for drugs by the 
officers. R. 202: 96. 
5 
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B. Testimony of Officer Drew Hubbard 
Officer Hubbard joined Laursen at a location in Provo to assist as a backup officer. 
R. 202: 100. After they arrived a couple of houses from the address they believed the 
warrant suspect was they observed a female approach the house and knock on the front 
door. R. 202: 100-01. Another female occupant opened the door and the officers asked 
the female if the individuals were there to which she "indicated they were upstairs. R. 
202: 101. The officers entered the residence and were directed upstairs. R. 202: 101. 
As Hubbard went up the stairs he observed two individuals, one of them being the 
female they were looking for. She started to move across the room quickly so the 
officers "[qjuickly went into the room. Commands were given. Both individuals laid 
down, and [Hubbard] arrested the male, James Campbell." R. 202: 101-02. He placed 
Campbell in handcuffs and asked Campbell if he had "any weapons or needles or things 
that would hurt me on his person." Id. Hubbard testified that Campbell replied, "he may 
have a needle on him." Id. 
Hubbard searched Campbell and found a wallet and a contact lens case, but no 
needle. R. 202: 102, 106. He looked inside the case and found "two small balls—well, 
one or two small balls of cotton or some type of cottony material with brown residue on 
it."1 R. 202: 103. Hubbard gave the case to Laursen. R. 202: 103, 104. Hubbard 
testified that he believed that the cotton contained heroin. R. 202: 104. 
C. Testimony of Mandy Van Buren 
Mandy Van Buren is employed by the Utah State Crime Lab. R. 202: 110. She 
1
 At the suppression hearing, Hubbard testified that it was a single cotton ball. R. 
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tested the cotton ball and concluded that the brown residue contained heroin. R. 202: 
114. Van Buren testified that the lab does not include the weight of the substance on 
their reports if it's less than 100 milligrams. R. 202: 119. A sample of the cotton was cut 
off, dunked in a solution and then tested. R. 202: 118-19. "There was not a weighable 
amount of residue" on the cotton but there was a "testable amount[.]" R. 202: 125. 
Accordingly, in this case, because the weight was less than 100 milligrams, she reported 
the heroin as "residue," which is a low level amount and not solid material. R. 202: 119. 
The residue containing heroin could not be separated from the cotton. R. 202: 119-20. 
The weight she listed in her "notes is the dark brown residue plus the cotton." R. 202: 
120. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Campbell is not challenging the sufficiency of the evidence or the validity of his 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance. The case law seems to be clear that 
residue of a controlled substance is sufficient to prove possession so long as it is 
intentionally possessed knowing its narcotic character. Instead Campbell is asserting his 
due process right to have the jury instructed on possession of drug paraphernalia as a 
lesser included offense giving the jury the option of convicting him of the charged 
offense, acquitting on the charged offense and convicting on the lesser included offense, 
or acquitting him entirely. Campbell asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to 
instruct on the lesser included where the elements of possession and the elements of 
paraphernalia, in this case, overlap and where there was a rational basis in evidence to 
7 
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acquit him of felony possession and convict him of misdemeanor paraphernalia. While it 
is true that there may have been sufficient evidence to prove both possession and 
paraphernalia charges, where the State proceeded with a felony possession case base 
solely upon the residue evidence, and where the drug paraphernalia statute clearly 
identifies residue as an optional element to prove an object is drug paraphernalia, 
Campbell was entitled to argue to the jury that possession of the cotton and residue 
constituted the crime of paraphernalia and not the crime of possession of a controlled 
substance. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED CAMPBELL'S REQUEST TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON POSSESSION OF DRUG PARPHERNALIA AS A 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
Following the close of the State's case defense counsel asked the court to instruct 
the jury on possession of paraphernalia as a lesser included offense, even though the 
crimes have different elements, based on the principle of defendant requested lesser-
included as explained in State v. Carruth, 1999 UT 107, 993 P.2d 869, because the 
State's case lacked evidence to support the required intent element of possession of a 
controlled substance. R. 202: 126-28. The State objected to the instruction arguing that 
the evidence spoke for itself on the intent element and that the lesser included should not 
be provided because there was no reason "the jury would find the defendant not guilty of 
the main charge and yet guilty of the lesser included." R. 202: 129-30. Defense counsel 
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replied that there was a reasonable basis for the jury to convict on the lesser included 
because the same facts could support both crimes. R. 202: 130. 
The trial court concluded that because the residue on the cotton ball was heroin it 
was not paraphernalia and therefore not a lesser included offense. R. 202: 131. The court 
added The trial court denied the request for the lesser included instruction finding that 
although there was evidence of drug paraphernalia and that the "prosecution could have 
certainly added an offense... pertaining to the [items of paraphernalia]", "the Court 
cannot conclude that the ~ that possession of heroin would have a lesser included offense 
of possession of heroin residue because it's still heroin... It's not paraphernalia. So it's 
not really a lesser included offense." R. 202: 130-31. The court denied the request and 
placed the proposed instructions in the record. 
Campbell now asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to allow the jury to 
consider the charge of possession of a controlled substance as a lesser included offense 
because, under the facts presented, the facts "tend to prove elements of more than one 
statutory offense" and there was a "rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of 
the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense." State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 
152 (Utah 1983) {citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-402(4)). Campbell asks this Court to 
reverse the trial court's decision to preclude the lesser included instruction and order new 
trial permitting Campbell to present his defense of the lesser included to a jury. 
9 
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A. Relevant Law 
Lesser included offenses 
According to Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-402, "A defendant may be convicted of 
an offense included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and the included offense. An offense is so included when: (a) It is established by 
proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the 
offense charged..." This statute prohibits the court from entering a conviction upon both 
the charged offense and any lesser included offense based on the same facts. The statute 
continues, "[t]he court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of 
the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
1-402(4). This statute has been interpreted in the context of a defendant requested lesser 
included jury instruction in several Utah cases. The Utah Supreme Court set the 
"standard" in State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983). State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9,^ 24, 
154P.3d788. 
In Baker the Court examined a case where the defendant had been charged and 
convicted of burglary. On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court the defendant argued that 
the "trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the offense of criminal 
trespass" because he asserted criminal trespass was a lesser included offense. Baker, 
671 P.2d 152, 154. The evidence at trial showed the defendant climbed a fence, broke a 
window, entered a building, broke into a locked desk, and then concealed himself in a 
closet until being discovered by the police. Baker, at 154. 
1 n 
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In its analysis the Supreme Court examined "two standards used by trial and 
appellate courts in determining when to instruct a jury regarding lesser included 
offenses." Id., at 154. The first standard requires a court to give a lesser included 
instruction "if any reasonable view of the evidence would support such a verdict." Id., 
at 154 (citing State v. Gillian, 463 P.2d 811, 812 (Utah 1970)). The second standard 
required the a court to give a lesser included instruction where "the lesser offense must 
be a necessary element of the greater offense and must of necessity be embraced within 
the legal definition of the greater offense and be a part thereof." Id., at 154-55 (citing 
State v. Woolman, 33 P.2d 640, 645 (Utah 1935)). 
The Court then clarified these two standards by distinguishing them by which 
party is seeking the instruction. The second standard, or the "'necessarily included 
offense' should be limited to cases where the prosecution requests the instruction" 
while the "evidence based" standard required by the defendant's Due Process Rights 
should be applied when the defendant requests the instruction. Id., at 156-58. The 
Court then demonstrated how this evidence based standard is incorporated into Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-1-402. The statute says a court is not "obligated to charge the 
jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict 
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included 
offense." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-402(4). The relevant portion of the code defines an 
included offense as one "established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged." Baker, at 158 (citing 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-l-402(3)(a). 
11 
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The Court elaborated, "[w]here two offenses are related because some of their 
statutory elements overlap, and where the evidence at the trial of the greater offense 
includes some or all of those overlapping elements, the lesser offense is an included 
offense." Baker, at 159. And when "the evidence offered provides a 'rational basis for 
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the 
included offense" the court is obligated to instruct the jury on the lesser offense. Baker, 
at 159. Because the Court in Baker did "not believe that the evidence was ambiguous 
or subject to any alternative interpretation the required the court to instruct on a lesser 
offense" the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's refusal. The Court found that there 
was "not a sufficient quantum of evidence" supporting the alternative theories presented 
by the defendant on appeal because, although his arguments challenge the sufficiency 
of the evidence to convict of the charged offense, he failed to show evidence to support 
a "rational basis for a verdict acquitting [him] of the offense charged and convicting 
him of the included offense." Baker, at 160 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-402(4)). 
The Utah Supreme Court applied the Baker standard again in State v. Velarde, 734 
P.2d 449 (Utah 1986). There the defendant was convicted of second degree murder and 
appealed his conviction claiming the trial court "erred by refusing to instruct the jury 
regarding the offenses of simple assault, aggravated assault, and negligent homicide" 
claiming that "these offenses are lesser included offenses of second degree murder as it 
was charged in [his] case." Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 450. The Court reitereated that "[i]f a 
defendant requests a lesser included instruction... an evidence-based standard controls" 
and "the trial court must determine whether the offense is established by proof of the 
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same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the charged 
offense" and then, "if the evidence is ambiguous and susceptible to alternative 
explanations, the trial court must give the lesser included offense instruction if any one of 
the alternative interpretations provides both a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the charged offense and convicting him of the included offense." Velarde, at 
451. The Court also recalled that the Baker standard "does not allow the court in jury 
cases to weigh the credibility of the evidence offered by the defendant in support of his or 
her request..." but "only whether there is a sufficient quantum of evidence presented to 
justify charging the jury with the defendant's requested instruction." Id., at 451. 
At trial the defendant presented evidence admitting to playing a role in the assault 
on the victim, that he and his friends carried sticks into the fight, that he struck the victim 
with his fists, and that his partners struck the victim with their sticks. Id., at 451. The 
Court found that "[l]ooking at the evidence in a light most favorable to the defendant... 
[u]nder no rational view of the evidence could the defendant's conduct constitute gross 
negligence" which he needed to qualify for an instruction on negligent homicide. Id., at 
453. However, when the Court examined the defendant's claims to an aggravated assault 
instruction, because he offered evidence through his testimony about his lack of intent to 
cause death or serious bodily injury, even if his testimony was unconvincing, "[t]he trial 
court was under a duty to give defendant's requested lesser included offense instruction 
under the dictates of Baker." Id., at 454. 
_This Court applied the Baker standard in State v. Payne, 964 P.2d 327 (Utah App. 
1998) where the defendant was convicted of lewdness involving a child. The defendant 
13 
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appealed his conviction arguing that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on a 
lesser included offense of child abuse was erroneous. Payne, 964 P.2d 327, 329. The 
facts at trial demonstrated that the defendant, while wrestling with the child victim, held 
the victim upside down by one leg and rubbed the victim's genital area, over the 
clothing, and then fondled the victim's genitals under her clothing while watching a 
movie. Payne, at 329. 
At trial the court instructed the jury that it could find [the defendant] guilty or not 
guilty of sexual abuse of a child, or the lesser included offense of lewdness involving a 
child. The defendant objected, arguing that the jury should have also been instructed on 
gross lewdness and on child abuse as lesser included offenses. Id., at 331. The trial 
court refused to give those instructions and the defendant appealed that refusal. Id., at 
331. 
In its analysis this Court reviewed the Baker standard to the child abuse requests 
and noted that "some crimes have multiple variations, so that a greater-lesser 
relationship exists between some variations of these crimes, but not between others." 
Payne, at 333 (citing State v. Simpson, 904 P.2d 709, 713 (Utah App. 1995) (internal 
cite omitted)). Because sexual abuse could be proved by either intent to cause 
emotional or bodily pain or by intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire, and because 
child abuse can be proved by intentional infliction of a condition which imperils a 
child's health or welfare, there is a greater lesser relationship, even though the two 
elements of the two crimes are not strictly analogous. Id., at 333. The Court also found 
that when examining whether or not there the evidence presented a rational basis for 
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acquittal on the charged crime and conviction on the lesser included (the second Baker 
factor) "trial courts have little or not leeway." Id., at 333. Because the defendant 
introduced evidence that the injuries sustained to the victims genital area could have 
been caused by the wrestling creating a rational basis for conviction on the lesser 
included offense and acquittal on the greater offense, the defendant was entitled to a 
lesser included instruction on child abuse. Id., at 334. 
The Court eventually found that the trial court's error was harmless because of it 
found there was no substantial likelihood of a different outcome, even though the trial 
court should have given the lesser included instruction. Id., at 335. The Court focused 
on the strength of the victim's testimony, the eyewitness testimony, and the physical 
evidence described by the expert witness. Together these facts made it so unlikely that 
the jury would have acquitted the defendant of sexual abuse even if it had the option of 
convicting the defendant of child abuse. Id., at 334-35. 
In State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, fflf 1-4, 154 P.3d 788 the defendant was convicted 
of aggravated burglary and attempted murder for entering a woman's hotel room, putting 
a gun to her head, pulling the trigger causing a misfire, striking the woman with the gun, 
fleeing the room, and then again pointing the gun at the woman and attempting to fire as 
she chased after him. At trial the defendant presented a defense that he had been 
misidentified by the victim and that presented an alibi for the time of the offense. Powell, 
2007 UT 9, 1} 8-9. He also requested to have the jury instructed on the lesser included 
offenses of assault and aggravated assault. Powell, at If 24. The Supreme Court applied 
the Baker standard and found that although attempted murder, assault, and aggravated 
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assault have overlapping statutory elements and the evidence offered at trial tended to 
prove elements of the lesser offenses (making assault and aggravated assault lesser 
included offenses of attempted murder), because there was "no rational basis in the 
evidence presented at trial for a verdict acquitting [the defendant] of attempted murder 
and convicting him of the lesser included offenses..." Id., at If 25-26. The Court found 
that because the defendant's did not contest the details of the attack which clearly 
supported attempted murder but rather focused on his complete innocence by alibi and 
misidentification there was no rational basis for conviction on the lesser offenses. Id., at Tf 
28. 
In State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, 152 P.3d 315 the defendant was charged and 
convicted of first degree murder. He appealed his conviction claiming he was entitled 
to jury instructions on both extreme emotional distress manslaughter and imperfect 
legal justification manslaughter. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, Tf 1. The Court of Appeals 
granted his appeal and the Utah Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certiorari 
to determine whether or not the evidence required the trial court to instruct the jury on 
the affirmative defenses.2 Spillers, at ^ 1, 9. Neither party contested the first prong of 
the Baker standard so the Court only considered whether there was "a rational basis to 
acquit Defendant of murder and convict him of manslaughter." Spillers, at 112. 
2
 The State contended that because the defendant had requested instructions on 
affirmative defenses, and not lesser included offenses, the Baker standard should not 
apply, however the Court found that the standards are "indistinguishable" and "[i]n either 
case, a defendant is entitled to an instruction i f there is any reasonable basis in 
evidence.'" Spillers, at fn. 1 {citing State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980)). 
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On the matter of extreme emotional distress manslaughter the Court considered 
the evidence presented and found, despite the State's assertion that defendant failed to 
prove extreme emotional distress, that "[a] jury could infer Defendant's mental state 
from the testimony of Defendant and others that supported his theory of the case... 
Based on the entirety of the evidence at trial, a jury could choose to believe Defendant's 
version of events and conclude that Defendant was experiencing extreme emotional 
distress at the time of the shooting for which there was a reasonable explanation or 
excuse." Id., at ffl[ 19-20. "As long as the evidence presented at trial supports a 
defendant's theory of the crime and provides a rational basis for a verdict on the lesser 
included offense, a defendant is entitled to the jury instruction if he requests it." Id., at f^ 
19. 
Possession of a Controlled Substance and Drug Paraphernalia 
Conviction for possession of a controlled substance, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), requires proof that a person knowingly and intentionally 
possessed or used a controlled substance. This statute does not contain any reference to a 
minimum amount required to support a conviction for possession. Utah cases have 
addressed this issue and have held that a conviction does not require proof of any amount 
so long as the possession is shown to be knowing and intentional. 
In State v. Winters, 396 P.2d 872, 873-74 (Utah 1964), the defendant was 
convicted of possession of narcotic drugs after a white powder substance, which tested 
positive for heroin, was found in his jail cell. The defendant appealed his conviction 
contending, among other things, "the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that, 
17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in order to convict, the amount of narcotic drug possessed must be found to be a useable 
amount." Winters, 396 P.2d 872, 875. This claim arose from the fact that, although the 
state chemist testified the powder contained heroin he did not know how much heroin the 
powder contained. Winters, 396 P.2d at 873. The Utah Supreme Court rejected this claim 
and found that "[t]he determinative test is possession of a narcotic drug, not the useability 
(sic) of a narcotic drug." Winters, at 875. 
This Court in State v. Warner, 788 P.2d 1041, 1041-42 (Utah App. 1990) revisited 
the Winters rule in a case where the defendant was convicted of possession of a 
controlled substance for residue in a vial found in his possession following his arrest. 
The defendant appealed his conviction claiming the trial court erred in determining that 
the residue of methamphetamine found on the vial was sufficient to convict him of 
possessing a controlled substance..." Warner, 788 P.2d 1041, 1042. "At trial, the State's 
chemist admitted that the quantity of methamphetamine found in the vial was insufficient 
to cause any physical effect on a person." Warner, 788 P.2d at 1042. The defendant 
claimed because the possession statute did not specify the amount of controlled substance 
required for conviction, "the amount possessed must be sufficient to cause a physical 
effect on a person," otherwise known as the useable amount test. Warner, at 1042-43. 
This Court cited Winters and found that the trial court did not err in refusing to 
interpret the possession statute to "require possession of a sufficient quantity of illegal 
substance to cause a physical effect" because of the holding in Winters. See also State v. 
Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030 (Utah App. 1994) (evidence of cocaine residue sufficient to support 
conviction for cocaine possession). 
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Conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§ 58-37a-5(l)(a), requires proof that a person use, or possess with intent to use any drug 
paraphernalia to inject, ingest or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the 
human body. A non-exhaustive list of drug paraphernalia items is contained in Utah 
Code Annotated § 58-37a-3 and includes kits used to plant, grow, manufacture or 
produce controlled substances, devices used to increase the potency of controlled 
substances, devices used to analyze purity of controlled substances, items used to weigh 
controlled substances, diluents used to cut controlled substances, sifters used to remove 
impurities from marijuana, items used to mix controlled substances, containers used to 
store controlled substances, and needles or objects used to inject or ingest controlled 
substances. Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-4 provides factors to determine whether an 
object is paraphernalia. These factors include "the existence of any residue of a 
controlled substance on the object..." UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-4(5). Thus, 
paraphernalia is separate from controlled substances but the presence of controlled 
substances and the relationship an object has to a controlled substance can help a fact 
finder determine whether an object constitutes paraphernalia. 
In State v. Sorenson, 2003 UT App 292, *1, the defendant claimed on appeal that 
he could not be "charged with both possession of methamphetamine and possession of 
paraphernalia because the methamphetamine charge stems from the presence of residue 
on the items the prosecution claim[ed were] paraphernalia." Presumably he argued that 
the residue could not both be a controlled substance for purposes of possession as well as 
proof that the objects were paraphernalia, that it must be one or the other. This Court 
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disagreed and found that because the "items could be considered paraphernalia even 
without the residue because of the presence of residue is a factor, rather than a 
requirement, used in determining whether an item is paraphernalia." Soreneson, 2003 UT 
App 292, *1. The Court found "residue can form the basis for the methamphetamine 
charge, independent of the paraphernalia charge." Id. 
Several relevant rules can be extracted from the above cited case law, first, 
evidence of residue of a controlled substance can be sufficient to support a conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance even where the residue is not a useable amount. 
Second, residue of a controlled substance can be used both as a factor to prove an object 
constitutes drug paraphernalia and as independent evidence of possession of a controlled 
substance. And third, when a defendant requests an instruction on a lesser included, and 
the two elements of the two offenses overlap, if there is a rational basis for the jury to 
acquit on the charged crime and convict on the included crime, the defendant is entitled 
to the instruction. 
B. Application 
In this case, the elements of possession of a controlled substance and the 
elements of possession of drug paraphernalia overlap making paraphernalia an 
included offense. 
In Baker criminal trespass was found to be an included offense to burglary because 
both statutes required proof that the defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a 
building. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159-60. Criminal trespass is not a necessary included 
offense to burglary but instead is an included offense based on the evidence based 
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approach. In Payne child abuse was found to be an included offense to sexual abuse of a 
child because "[although there are variations in the elements of these two offenses, a 
greater-lesser relationship clearly exists between some of these variations." Payne, 964 
P.2d327,333. 
Here, possession of a controlled substance was proved in part by the fact that there 
was a residue of heroin on the cotton ball. Had the trial court allowed the instruction on 
paraphernalia it would have been proved in part by the fact that there was heroin residue 
on the cotton ball. "In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, the trial of 
fact, in addition to all other logically relevant factors, should consider:... the existence of 
any residue of a controlled substance." UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-4. According to 
Baker, because "the same facts tend to prove elements of more than one statutory 
offense... the offenses are related under f 76-1-402." Baker, at 158. Even though some 
of the elements of paraphernalia have no equivalent to the elements of possession, 
because under the variation of paraphernalia at issue by theses facts, the charge of 
paraphernalia would be "established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission o f possession, paraphernalia is an included offense. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-402(3). 
In this case there was a rational basis for the jury to acquit Campbell of 
possession of heroin and convict him of possession of drug paraphernalia. 
"The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included 
offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting him of the included offense." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-402(4). 
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On this point trial counsel did a very good job, given the fact that the trial court prevented 
her from instructing the jury on paraphernalia. Counsel cross examined the officers who 
testified that the cotton ball was used to "filter out any impurities and things other than 
heroin that the individual wanted to introduce into their body." R. 202: 93. They testified 
that the cotton would filter out "[a]nything foreign, anything other than the heroin..." and 
that it would "clean the impurities or the large objects from getting inside the needle." R. 
202: 96, 105. See also R. 202: 107-08 ("From my understanding is that the cotton balls 
are used to filter a substance, which heroin is broken down into through heat or liquid, 
and they get that into the needle, they need to remove the impurities so it can No. 1, get 
into the needle and not cause problems. Number 2, you don't want a chunk getting into 
your veins, I'm assuming, and they use cotton or they use something that will stop that 
transmission of those larger objects into the syringe."). The combination of this 
testimony suggests that the residue left in the cotton, while demonstrating the cotton's use 
as paraphernalia, does not represent the part of the heroin that is injected or used by the 
person. What is left in the cotton is the impurities in the heroin. 
Counsel then cross examined the lab technician after she testified that the residue in 
the cotton was tested and "matched heroin." R. 202: 114. Van Buren testified she 
weighed the sample and, because it was "such a low level", even the balances she used 
could not accurately weight it. R. 202: 119. She testified that the heroin she tested 
"wasn't a solid material" and merely a residue that could not be separated from the 
cotton. R. 202: 119-20. When this testimony is added to the information received from 
the police the inference can be made that although there is no minimum requirement for 
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possession of a controlled substance, in this case there was such a small amount of heroin 
that the only use of the fact that heroin was present was as evidence that the cotton 
constituted paraphernalia. 
Counsel then argued in closing that what was really in evidence was a "dirty cotton 
ball" that at a molecular level contained trace amounts of heroin, and that the police 
testified was used to strain the impurities out of heroin before the heroin was injected. R. 
202: 155. Counsel emphasized the absolutely minimal amount of heroin at issue to infer 
that Campbell may not have knowingly or intentionally possessed heroin based on the 
fact that he likely believed it had all been used up. 
This inference would have been supported by the argument counsel made in closing 
about the fact that much of U.S. currency in circulation has cocaine residue on it. While 
one would be surprised if, after having been made aware that the money in one's wallet 
in fact had traces of drugs on it one could be prosecuted for knowingly and intentionally 
possessing a controlled substance. Of course this is an extreme example but it illustrates 
the point counsel could have and likely would have argued to the jury, namely, that at 
some point the amount of controlled substance in one's possession does become relevant 
to the crime of charge of possession even if legally there is no minimum requirement. It 
would have been perfectly reasonable for counsel to encourage the jury, and for the jury 
to have 
The jury could have accepted this argument and found that because there was such a 
small amount of heroin, an amount that could neither be weighed or extracted from the 
cotton, Campbell did not knowingly possess it and instead find that he knowingly 
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possessed paraphernalia used to inject heroin as proved by the existence of the trace 
amounts of heroin residue. That is a perfectly rational basis, supported by the evidence, 
for the jury to have acquitted Campbell of possession and to have convicted him of drug 
paraphernalia. The jury likely believed that Campbell used heroin at some earlier time, 
and they likely believed that he used the cotton ball to strain it. They could have 
believed, as appeared to be the case, that Campbell believed he no longer possessed any 
heroin. 
In the cases discussed above Utah courts have demonstrated instances of a rational 
basis to acquit on the charged offense and convict on the included offense. In Baker the 
Court found that the evidence was not "subject to any alternative interpretation that 
required the court to instruct on the lesser offense" because the defendant, having been 
charged with burglary, was found by the police in the storage closet of a locked building 
on the morning immediately following the break-in, where the window and a lock on the 
desk had been broken with the contents scattered. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 154, 159. The 
Court found that the only disputed element between burglary and the included offense of 
criminal trespass was the defendant's intent, which was inferred from circumstantial 
evidence. Because the defendant did not present any evidence upon the specific intent 
required for the criminal trespass charge the Court found he had not satisfied the 'rational 
basis for a verdict acquitting on the greater and convicting on the lesser' requirement. 
Baker, at 160. 
In Payne the key to this second set of Baker factors was that, although the 
defendant's claim that the victim's injuries were caused by roughhousing rather than by 
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improper touching was not compelling, it would have permitted the jury to infer the 
touching was child abuse and not sexual abuse. Because the court is not allowed to 
"weigh the credibility of the evidence offered by a defendant in support of his or her 
request for a lesser included", even though this Court may not have been convinced of the 
validity of the theory it was obligated to find the evidence provided a rational basis for a 
verdict acquitting him of sexual abuse or lewdness involving a child and convict him of 
child abuse. 
In Velarde the Court found there was no way for the jury to have viewed the 
evidence and acquitted him of second degree murder and yet convict him of negligent 
homicide. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 453. Although there was evidence which would have 
allowed the jury to find the killing was reckless, the Court found there was no rational 
basis support a verdict for negligence. The key to this distinction, it seems, is that the 
defendant admitted that he used means likely to produce death or serious bodily injury 
and that he committed an aggravated assault. His admission to using such force and 
engaging in such conduct demonstrated that he was aware of the substantial and 
unjustified risk and thus could not support a theory that he was not but should have been 
aware of the risk as required by criminal negligence. 
In Powell "[t]he State's evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that Powell 
attacked Ellis with the specific intent to kill. Ellis testified that Powell put the gun to her 
head, threatened her life, and then attempted to fire the gun." Powell, 2007 UT 9, If 28. 
"Powell presented no evidence contesting the details of the attack" and therefore did not 
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provide a rational basis upon which the jury could have concluded that he was not 
guilty of attempted murder but instead was guilty of aggravated assault. Powell, at % 31. 
In Spillers the Court concluded that the evidence provided a rational basis "to 
warrant the extreme emotional distress manslaughter instruction" because, even though 
the State presented evidence the defendant was acting rationally, there was also evidence 
that he was not acting rationally and that ambiguity was a question to be determined by 
the jury. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ]f 18. Because the jury could have chosen "to believe 
Defendant's version of events" and reach a verdict of guilt on the lesser included the 
defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense. Spillers, at f| 
20-21. 
Unlike the defendant in Baker, the jury here did hear evidence supporting all the 
elements of paraphernalia. The jury heard that Campbell possessed the residue stained 
cotton, that the cotton was likely used to strain or filter heroin before it was injected into 
the human body and that the heroin found within the cotton was such a minuscule amount 
that it was merely the waste product of heroin use, an amount Campbell may not have 
knowingly possessed. Much like the defendant in Payne, Campbell has presented and 
argued a good reason for the jury to have acquitted him of possession and convicted him 
paraphernalia. Even if this Court does not believe the lab technician when she said the 
heroin residue was so slight it could not be separated from the cotton or the police when 
they testified that what is left in the cotton is just the waste, this Court should conclude 
that there is a rational basis to support Campbell's paraphernalia instruction. 
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Unlike the defendant in Velarde, Campbell is not presenting theories for multiple 
but conflicting included offenses. Campbell has maintained consistently that the conduct 
he engaged in was possession of paraphernalia. Nothing in his defense to the charge of 
possession of heroin interferes or contradicts the theory that the residue in the cotton 
demonstrates the cotton was paraphernalia. Unlike the defendant in Powell, Campbell 
did present evidence to support the lesser included conviction. Despite the trial court's 
assertion that the "residue is heroin... [i]t's not paraphernalia... [s]o it's not really a 
lesser included offense" there was a rational basis for the jury to conclude Campbell did 
not knowingly and intentionally possess heroin but did possess drug paraphernalia. R. 
202: 131. 
As explained in Baker, "where proof of an element of the crime is in dispute, the 
availability of the 'third option" - the choice of conviction of a lesser offense rather than 
conviction of the greater or acquittal - gives the defendant the benefit of the reasonable 
doubt standard." Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157. Campbell now asserts that this benefit is 
closely tied to his due process right to a fair trial and that while his "right to a lesser 
included offense is limited by the evidence presented at trial", where, according to the 
evidence-based standard, there was a rational basis in evidence to support conviction 
upon the included offense, he was entitled to the benefit of the reasonable doubt and 
should have been given the opportunity to try the included offense of paraphernalia to the 
jury. Because there was a sufficient quantum of evidence supporting the paraphernalia 
offense, because the evidence of possession was ambiguous and susceptible to alternative 
interpretations, according to both the officers' and the technician's testimony, "a jury 
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question exists and the court must give a lesser included offense instruction at the request 
of the defendant." Baker, at 159. 
The trial court's error was not harmless because there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result. 
Finally, in order to prevail in this case Campbell must demonstrate that the trial 
court's error in refusing to instruct the jury on the included offense of paraphernalia was 
not harmless. See Payne, 964 P.2d 327, 334 ("[E]ven if a trial court errs in refusing to 
instruct a jury on a lesser included offense, reversal is appropriate only where the error is 
prejudicial."). In order to prove a harmful error "the likelihood of a different outcome 
must be sufficiently high to undermine the confidence in the verdict." Payne, 964 P.2d 
327, 334 {citing State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898, 902 (Utah App. 1996)). 
Payne is the only case, of those cited above, which directly addresses the issue of 
harmless error in the lesser included offense circumstance because the rational basis upon 
which the charge offense is acquitted and the included offense is convicted demonstrates 
the reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. In Payne, despite the fact that the 
Court found there was a rational basis upon which the defendant could have been 
acquitted for the greater offense and convicted of the included offense, the Court found 
the trial court's error harmless because the defendant presented no contradictory evidence 
to the facts that the victim testified he had rubbed her genital area both outside and inside 
her clothing, that an independent witness corroborated the victim's account, and each of 
the those testimonies corroborated the physical evidence presented by the doctor who 
examined the victim. Payne, at 334. Because the jury would have had to "reject the 
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consistent testimony of two witnesses who independently registered their concerns with 
adults immediately after the incident" "in favor of mere inferences that are conceivable 
from the evidence but are by no means compelled by it" there was "no reasonable 
likelihood that, had the court properly instructed it on child abuse, the jury would have 
convicted Payne of this offense" rather than the greater offense. Payne, at 335. In order 
to accept the defendant's theory the jury would have had to believe that the defendant 
repeatedly touched the child's genitals during wrestling, causing injury, not based upon 
testimony but based on inference meanwhile rejecting seemingly credible testimony to 
the contrary. 
Unlike Payne, Campbell's alternative theory is not based on inference, it is based 
upon the direct testimony of the State's witnesses. Campbell is not asking the jury to 
reject any of the State's evidence. Rather, he is asking only that the jury, after having 
seen the evidence, be able to see the alternative law, to see what the charge of 
paraphernalia is and to have the chance to convict him upon a crime which more closely 
reflect the facts presented. It is very likely that, had the jury had the opportunity to 
convict on paraphernalia, they would have acquitted Campbell of possession and 
convicted him of paraphernalia. That likelihood of a better result makes the trial court's 
error harmful and makes this case one worthy of reversal and remand for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Because the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury upon the lesser included 
offense of possession of drug paraphernalia, where according to the evidence presented 
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the elements of the two offenses overlap and there was a rational basis for the jury to 
acquit Campbell of possession of a controlled substance and convict him of possession of 
drug paraphernalia, this Court should reverse Campbell's conviction and remand to the 
trial court for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 1 Oth day of June, 2011. 
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vvesnaw 
U.CA. 1953 § 58-37-8 Page 1 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 58. Occupations and Professions 
*1 Chapter 37. Utah Controlled Substances Act (Refs & Annos) 
-• § 58-37-8. Prohibited acts-Penalties 
(1) Prohibited acts A-Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a con-
trolled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a con-
trolled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation of any provision 
of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 
37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more persons with re-
spect to whom the person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of manage-
ment. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, or 
gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second 
or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
U.L../Y. 1V3J 9 3 5 - J / - 5 Page 2 
third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to im-
prisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in 
Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during the 
commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by im-
prisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or ex-
ecution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B-Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance analog or a con-
trolled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner 
while acting in the course of the person's professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, air-
craft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully pos-
sessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 
100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and the 
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amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a conviction under Subsec-
tion (l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled substances not included in 
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemean-
or. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent 
conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of property oc-
cupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confine-
ment shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the convic-
tion is with respect to controlled substances as listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided 
by law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year to run consecutively 
and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided 
by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of six months to run consec-
utively and not concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not amounting to a viola-
tion of Section 76-5-207: 
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(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in the person's body any measurable 
amount of a controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, causing serious bodily 
injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death of another. 
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in the person's body: 
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or 
a controlled substance classified under Schedule II is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA) 
is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(i) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering serious bodily injury or death as a result 
of the person's negligent driving in violation of Subsection 58-37-8(2)(g) whether or not the injuries arise 
from the same episode of driving. 
(3) Prohibited acts C-Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a license number which 
is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled 
substance, to assume the title of, or represent oneself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physi-
cian, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a pre-
scription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession 
of, or to procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person 
to disclose receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, al-
teration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or to utter the same, 
or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, or 
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reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any like-
ness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit 
controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D-Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this chapter who commits 
any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or un-
der Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and 
classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of those 
schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the time of 
the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) 
and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or 
structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library; 
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in Subsections 
(4)(a)(i),(ii),(iv),(vi),and(vii); 
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act occurs; or 
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(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or distribution of a substance 
in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in Section 
76-8-311.3. 
(b)(i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned 
for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this 
Subsection (4) would have been a first degree felony. 
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for proba-
tion. »' 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less than a first degree 
felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more 
than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a violation of 
Subsection (2)(g). 
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, and the 
court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting with the mental state re-
quired for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, en-
courages, or intentionally aids another person to commit a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly believed the indi-
vidual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection 
(4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B misdemeanor. 
(6) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections (l)(b) and (2)(c), a plea of guilty or no contest to a 
violation of this section which is held in abeyance under Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equival-
ent of a conviction, even if the charge has been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance with the plea 
in abeyance agreement. 
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(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section, notwithstanding a charge and sen-
tence for a violation of any other section of this chapter. 
(8)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or adminis-
trative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state, conviction or acquittal 
under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a person or persons pro-
duced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie 
evidence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or substances. 
(10) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of the veterinarian's profession-
al practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering controlled substances or 
from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under the veterinarian's direction and 
supervision. 
(11) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation con-
trolled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary 
course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of the officer's employment. 
(12)(a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian, as defined in Subsection 
58-37-2(l)(v), who uses, possesses, or transports peyote for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connec-
tion with the practice of a traditional Indian religion as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(1 )(w). 
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as defined in Subsection 
58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the peyote was used, possessed, or transported by an In-
dian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian reli-
gion. 
(c)(i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative defense under this Subsec-
tion (12) as soon as practicable, but not later than 10 days prior to trial. 
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense. 
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(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for good cause shown, if the pro-
secutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice. 
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection (12) by a preponderance of the 
evidence. If the defense is established, it is a complete defense to the charges. 
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstances, is held 
invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1971, c. 145, § 8; Laws 1972, c. 22, § 1; Laws 1977, c. 29, § 6; Laws 1979, c. 12, § 5; Laws 1985, c. 146, 
§ l;Laws 1986, c. 196, § l;Laws 1987, c. 92, § 100; Laws 1987, c. 190, § 3; Laws 1988, c. 95, § l;Laws 1989, 
c. 50, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 56, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 178, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 187, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 201, § 1; Laws 
1990, c. 161, § I; Laws 1990, c. 163, §§ 2, 3; Laws 1991, c. 80, § 1; Laws 1991, c. 198, § 4; Laws 1991, c. 268, 
§ 7; Laws 1995, c. 284, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 1, § 8, eff. Jan. 31, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 64, § 6, eff. 
May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. i 39, § 1, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 1999, c. 12, § 1, df. May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 
303, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2003, c. 10, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003: Laws 2003, c. 33, § 6, eff. May 5, 2003; 
Laws 2004, c. 36, § 1, dL March 15, 2004; Laws 2005, c. 30, § 1, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2006, c. 8, § 4, eff. 
May 1,2006; Laws 2006, c. 30, § 1, eff. May 1, 2006; Laws 2007, c. 374, § 1, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2008, c. 
295, § 1, df. May 5,2008; Laws 2009, c. 214, § 3, eff. May 12,2009; Laws 2010, c. 64, § 2. eff. March 22, 
2010. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Composite section by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of Laws 2006, c. 8, § 4 and Laws 
2006, c. 30, § 1. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Arrest of school employee, notice required, see § 53-10-211. 
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102. 
Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76-4-201 et seq. 
DUI, conviction defined, see § 41-6a-502. 
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felony, see § 76-3-301. 
Inchoate offenses, limitations on sentencing, see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4-302. 
Minors, suspension of driver's license for certain offenses, see § 78A-6-606. 
Penalties for felonies, see § 76-3-203. 
Penalties for misdemeanors, see § 76-3-204. 
Right to trial by jury, see Const. Art. 1, § 10. 
Vehicles subject to seizure and impoundment by peace officers, see § 41-6a-527. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
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P» 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 58. Occupations and Professions 
*1 Chapter 37A. Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act (Refs & Annos) 
-t § 58-37a-3. "Drug paraphernalia" defined 
As used in this chapter, "drug paraphernalia" means any equipment, product, or material used, or intended for 
use, to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, 
test, analyze, package, repackage, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or to otherwise introduce a con-
trolled substance into the human body in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act, and 
includes, but is not limited to: 
(1) kits used, or intended for use, in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, or harvesting any species of 
plant which is a controlled substance or from which a controlled substance can be derived; 
(2) kits used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, or prepar-
ing a controlled substance; 
(3) isomerization devices used, or intended for use, to increase the potency of any species of plant which is a 
controlled substance; 
(4) testing equipment used, or intended for use, to identify or to analyze the strength, effectiveness, or purity of a 
controlled substance; 
(5) scales and balances used, or intended for use, in weighing or measuring a controlled substance; 
(6) diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hydrochloride, mannitol, mannited, dextrose and lactose, used, or 
intended for use to cut a controlled substance; 
(7) separation gins and sifters used, or intended for use to remove twigs, seeds, or other impurities from mari-
huana; 
(8) blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing devices used, or intended for use to compound a controlled 
substance; 
(9) capsules, balloons, envelopes, and other containers used, or intended for use to package small quantities of a 
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controlled substance; 
(10) containers and other objects used, or intended for use to store or conceal a controlled substance; 
(11) hypodermic syringes, needles, and other objects used, or intended for use to parenterally inject a controlled 
substance into the human body; and 
(12) objects used, or intended for use to ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the hu-
man body, including but not limited to: 
(a) metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or ceramic pipes with or without screens, permanent screens, 
hashish heads, or punctured metal bowls; 
(b) water pipes; 
(c) carburetion tubes and devices; 
(d) smoking and carburetion masks; 
(e) roach clips: meaning objects used to hold burning material, such as a marihuana cigarette, that has become 
too small or too short to be held in the hand; 
(f) miniature cocaine spoons and cocaine vials; 
(g) chamber pipes; 
(h) carburetor pipes; 
(i) electric pipes; 
(j) air-driven pipes; 
(k) chillums; 
(1) bongs; and 
(m) ice pipes or chillers. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 58. Occupations and Professions 
*[§ Chapter 37A. Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act (Refs & Annos) 
-• § 58-37a-4. Considerations in determining whether object is drug paraphernalia 
In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, the trier of fact, in addition to all other logically relevant 
factors, should consider: 
(1) statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning its use; 
(2) prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, under any state or federal law re-
lating to a controlled substance; 
(3) the proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of this chapter; 
(4) the proximity of the object to a controlled substance; 
(5) the existence of any residue of a controlled substance on the object; 
(6) instructions whether oral or written, provided with the object concerning its use; 
(7) descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or depict its use; 
(8) national and local advertising concerning its use; 
(9) the manner in which the object is displayed for sale; 
(10) whether the owner or anyone in control of the object is a legitimate supplier of like or related items to the 
community, such as a licensed distributor or dealer of tobacco products; 
(11) direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the object to the total sales of the business enter-
prise; 
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(12) the existence and scope of legitimate uses of the object in the community; and 
(13) expert testimony concerning its use. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1981, c. 76, §4. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Controlled Substances C^> 42. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 96Hk42. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Probable cause 2 
Validity 1 
1. Validity 
Commercial free speech rights of owners of stores that sold smoking accessories were not infringed by provi-
sions of Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act prohibiting advertising. U.C.A. 1953, 58-37a-4, 58-37a-5. Murphy v. 
Matheson, 1984,742 F.2d 564. Constitutional Law €^> 1645; Controlled Substances € ^ > 6 
Even if Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act implicated noncommercial speech, any effect on expression of ideas would 
be minimal and thus would not violate overbreadth doctrine requirement that to be overbroad a statute must 
reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. U.C.A. 1953,58-37a-4,58-37a-5; U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amends. 1, 14. Murphy v. Matheson, 1984,742 F.2d 564. Controlled Substances € ^ > 6 
Provision of Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act setting out "logically relevant factors" to be considered by trier of 
fact in determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia was not unconstitutionally vague. U.C.A. 1953, 
58-37a-4; U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14. Murphy v. Matheson. 1984.742 F.2d 564. Controlled Substances 
€ = > 6 
2. Probable cause 
Officer reasonably believed that defendant's use of needles and syringes was illegal, such that officer had prob-
able cause to arrest defendant; store employee reported that woman had been observed on security camera and 
that she was injecting herself with heroin, and when officer arrived, the woman was still injecting herself, 
thereby corroborating tip received from employee, and employee's further tip that defendant and his companion 
had been with the woman and were still at the location led to reasonable inference that the men were observed 
on camera in close proximity in space with woman shortly before officer arrived, and when defendant removed 
syringes from his pocket, officer noticed that they were not accompanied by medicine, and defendant's syringes 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 58. Occupations and Professions 
*1 Chapter 37A. Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act (Refs & Annos) 
-t § 58-37a-5. Unlawful acts 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, 
cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, 
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body 
in violation of this chapter. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, 
any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, 
harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, 
conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of 
this act. [FN 1 j Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a person under 18 years of age who is 
three years or more younger than the person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4)(a) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publica-
tion any advertisement, knowing that the purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug 
paraphernalia. 
(b) Any person who violates this Subsection (4) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(5) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section, notwithstanding a charge and sen-
tence for a violation of any other section of this chapter. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1981, c. 76, § 5; Laws 2008, c. 295, § 3, eff. May 5, 2008. 
[FN11 Laws 1981, c. 76, that enacted this chapter. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*1 Chapter 1. General Provisions (Refs & Annos) 
*|§ Part 4. Multiple Prosecutions and Double Jeopardy 
-f § 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode-Included offenses 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish of-
fenses which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punish-
able under only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a pro-
secution under any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the court other-
wise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned on the first in-
formation or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of 
both the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the 
offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or 
an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a ration-
al basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall 
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determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is suf-
ficient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact 
required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or re-
versed and a judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such re-
lief is sought by the defendant. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-1-402; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 2. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Rights of accused persons, generally, see Const. Art. 1, § 12. 
Rights of defendant, see § 77-1-6. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Criminal Law €^> 29, 620. 
Double Jeopardy €^> 138, 139, 161. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 110k29; 110k620; 135Hkl38; 135Hkl39; 135Hkl61. 
C J.S. Criminal Law §§ 14, 248,251 to 253, 255, 260 to 263, 266 to 267, 558 to 561. 
CJ.S. Larceny §§ 53 to 54. 
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